INTRODUCTION
The post-conviction habeas corpus remedy has long resided in a legal no-man's-land. 1 It involves rulings about criminal process in the context of a civil proceeding. It empowers lower federal courts to review state court convictions and even state supreme court judgments. 2 And despite the writ's deep equitable roots, the Supreme Court and Congress in recent decades have curtailed its availability in ways that strike many as inequitable.
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habeas claims: (1) a rule that applicants must exhaust their claims in state court, 6 (2) a procedural default doctrine that generally bars a remedy if the state court ruling rests on an independent state procedural ground, 7 (3) an abuse of the writ doctrine that precludes relief for most successive petitions, 8 (4) a time limitations rule that requires prompt filing, 9 and (5) the Teague rule preventing consideration of claims that rely on "new rules" of constitutional procedure. 10 As these five companion doctrines have taken hold, scholars have searched in vain for sound overarching principles binding them together.
11
The Court's most frequently expressed justifications for these bars, intoned almost as a mantra, rest on concerns about comity, federalism, and finality. 12 But this now-familiar rhetoric fails, in part because virtually any limitation on the habeas remedy (including its complete elimination) would further these aims. No less importantly, the Court has not satisfactorily explained how these concerns are connected to the applicability of the writ. Although the Court has suggested that comity, federalism, and finality are connected with "equitable principles," 13 it has never explained why that is so.
In short, the Court's loose talk of comity, federalism, and finality offers a wholly inadequate explanation for the habeas gatekeeping mechanisms it has fashioned. Even worse, it has obscured the importance of habeas's equitable roots to current doctrine.
14 Indeed, four of the five bars-abuse of the writ, procedural default, exhaustion, and timelinessshare features that correspond with the remedy's historical equitable origins. First, all four adhere to traditional equitable defenses, including unclean hands, laches, and the availability of an adequate remedy at law. Second, each doctrine focuses on the applicant's conduct, taking account of whether delays and failures to raise claims were justifiable or not. Finally, in keeping with traditional equitable notions, the Court has fashioned ameliorative exceptions to each bar that respond to case-specific considerations of fairness. 15 The Court's Teague retroactivity bar-which eliminates the habeas remedy for the violation of any new constitutional procedural rule recognized after the applicant's conviction became final 16 -does not share these critical characteristics. It has no connection to any traditional equitable doctrine, it does not respond to any individual blameworthy conduct, and it does not give way based on considerations of individual circumstances, regardless of how compelling they are. Empirical evidence demonstrates that capital cases represent a disproportionate percentage of Teague-barred claims, making the retroactivity bar's absence of any equitable characteristics particularly problematic. 17 This Article both documents and responds to the nonequitable nature of the Court's current-and distinctively rigid-retroactivity bar. In particular, it urges the Court to refashion its retroactivity bar by drawing on traditional equity practices to create exceptions that take account of individual burdens and blame.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the historical equitable ancestry of the habeas remedy and provides an overview of the current habeas doctrine's gatekeeping requirements. Part II analyzes the ways in which four of those gatekeeping limitations draw on the remedy's equitable origins. Part III turns to the Court's nonretroactivity doctrine, its development, and the ways in which it abandons the equitable principles 14 The Court frequently has invoked "equitable principles" in its decisions, but virtually all of those references involve only the state's federalism, comity, and finality concerns. See present in the other gatekeeping limitations. Finally, Part IV offers concrete proposals that would enable the Court to introduce equity into the retroactivity bar.
I. THE HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ITS GATEKEEPING LIMITATIONS The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided an equitable remedy to prisoners "in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States." 18 In keeping with English common law, the Court held that the statute authorized relief from confinement where the court imposing confinement lacked jurisdiction or where the Executive had detained the prisoner without legal process. 19 Over the next 150 years, Congress and the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the habeas remedy in two major ways. First, in 1867, Congress authorized federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in state (as well as federal) custody. 20 Second, the Court held that a federal writ of habeas corpus could be granted to any prisoner claiming that a court in an earlier criminal proceeding had disregarded his constitutional rights and that "the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights." 21 These substantive expansions were consistent with the historically broad, equitable nature of the writ-both in England and in the United States. Professor Paul Halliday's careful historical account of the use of habeas corpus by the King's Bench in England demonstrates that, although the King's Bench was a common law court, it used habeas in a way that "was equitable in everything but name." 22 In particular, the King's Bench could "plug any existing gaps in law to right all wrongs." 23 The habeas 18 Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. As other scholars have noted, the federal statutory habeas remedy merely supplemented the common law habeas remedy available in state courts, and even post-Erie, the federal courts also for many years created a federal "common law" of habeas. See 144 remedy also took account of petitioners' individual circumstances, "rather than imposing obedience to a set of rules inscribed in precedents." 24 This flexibility of the King's Bench habeas remedy, and its sensitivity to the particular facts of the petitioner's case, demonstrated the equitable nature of the remedy. 25 Professor Halliday's research highlights several features about the issuance of the writs. First, and perhaps most important, "was the central fact of habeas corpus: that a judge should hear the sighs of all prisoners, regardless of where, how, or by whom they were held." 26 Second, the justices of the King's Bench freely used the common law writ to review imprisonment, even after Parliament passed the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act. 27 As a result, the writ continued to evolve as an instrument fine-tuned by judges and largely uninfluenced by parliamentary intervention. Finally, the power of the King's Bench to issue the writ emanated from the King's prerogative-the highly discretionary power the King wielded over his subjects-rather than from entrenched ideas about particular protections of individual liberty. 28 All of those to whom the King delegated power held the King's prerogative-"[w]hether a sheriff or common jailer, a tipstaff or messenger, whoever held the custody of one of the [K]ing's subjects did so by the prerogative." 29 Given their distinctly close relation to the King, 30 the King's Bench justices had the prerogative to inspect the work of all others to whom the King had delegated authority to imprison.
Use of the habeas remedy by the King's Bench peaked in 1789, 31 a significant fact because the Court has made clear that the protection of the writ in 1789 represents the "absolute minimum" for the current writ's protection under the Suspension Clause. 32 In the years leading up to 1789, the justices of the King's Bench increasingly used common law writs of habeas corpus to assert their authority to review imprisonment and release those unlawfully detained. 33 To be sure, many of those released had been imprisoned prior to conviction, but particularly in the early 17th century, a 24 Id. at 102. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 27 Id. at 239; Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 953-57 (2011) (book review). 28 HALLIDAY, supra note 22, at 7, 75. 29 Id. at 74. 30 Id. at 75 (describing the close proximity of the King's Bench justices to the King, both "legally as well as literally"). 31 Id. at 314; see also Vladeck, supra note 27, at 957-58 (characterizing 1777 to 1789 as "the highwater mark of habeas in England"). Professor Halliday's book draws from his review of every habeas corpus ad subjiciendum writ issued from the King's Bench every fourth year from 1502-1798. HALLIDAY, supra note 22, app. at 319. 32 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) . 33 HALLIDAY, supra note 22, at 309-10.
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significant percentage of the writs were issued post-conviction. 34 In short, Professor Halliday's historical account makes clear that the habeas writ in England was rooted in equitable principles, used broadly, and marked by flexibility rather than rigid and restrictive rules. 35 As the substantive reach of the habeas remedy expanded in the United States, however, the Supreme Court and then Congress set forth a series of procedural limitations-in particular, five gatekeeping requirements-that prevent federal courts from reaching the merits of habeas claims. The Court and Congress clearly have the authority to adopt such limitations. Congress determines the contours of the habeas remedy, and therefore can procedurally limit access to it, 36 and the Court for many years has exercised broad discretion in fashioning the remedy as part of its authority to interpret the habeas statute, crafting limitations on its availability even where it has jurisdiction.
37
Less clear is whether the gatekeeping requirements that Congress and the Court have developed make a coherent and justifiable body of doctrine.
Before turning to that matter, a brief description of each of the five gatekeeping requirements is in order. The five bars mandate dismissal of habeas claims 38 for: (1) failure to exhaust state remedies, (2) procedural default of an issue before the state court, (3) abuse of the writ through second or successive petitions, (4) failure to timely file, and (5) nonretroactivity. There are additional provisions limiting the availability of the habeas remedy, including AEDPA's requirement of deference to state court findings, 39 and the version of the harmless error 34 Id. app. at 328 ("When summary convictions are included in the analysis-the means by which most misdemeanants were convicted-post-conviction writs peaked in the early to middle part of the seventeenth century, as overall use of habeas corpus for misdemeanors peaked. For the period 1600-1650, nearly one-third (31%) of writs issued after conviction."). 35 Id. at 100-01. 36 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508-10 (1953) (deferring to Congress's authority to determine the availability of habeas relief). Of course, Congress's power to shape the writ is cabined by the Constitution's prohibition on suspending the writ. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also standard that governs habeas relief for constitutional error.
40
But those are categorically different from the gatekeeping requirements in that they do not altogether bar the courts from reaching the merits of habeas claims; instead, they simply set forth standards for considering those claims. Accordingly, the scope of this Article is limited to the five gatekeeping requirements.
The history of the first requirement, that applicants first exhaust their remedies in state court, dates back at least to Ex Parte Royall in 1886. 41 The Court justified this requirement on the grounds that it protects "the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law" 42 and that it ensures the development of a more complete record before applicants present their claims in federal court. 43 Congress later codified this requirement so that a habeas writ "shall not be granted unless . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State," or unless the state either lacks any corrective process or the process is "ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant."
44
The statute also specifies that "[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right under law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented," 45 thereby assuring that federal courts cannot reach claims where a state remedy is available.
Under the second bar-the procedural default doctrine-if an applicant fails to comply with a state's procedural rules and the state court therefore does not decide the merits of his claims, a federal habeas court cannot reach the merits of those claims. Unlike several of the other habeas bars, Congress has never codified the procedural default rule.
Third, the abuse of the writ doctrine bars federal habeas courts from considering claims raised in second or successive habeas petitions. Although the Court has rejected a strict res judicata rule to bar claims that were or might have been asserted in a previous petition, 50 it has imposed res judicata-like limits on petitioners by way of this doctrine.
51
The Court first explicitly recognized this rule in 1924. 52 Congress then codified it in 1948, 53 and expanded the limits on filing successive petitions when it passed AEDPA in 1996. 54 Fourth, AEDPA imposes a one-year filing deadline on habeas claims.
55
Not surprisingly, the Court had not previously adopted a statute of limitations for habeas actions.
56
Even so, AEDPA's limitation built on a rule that permitted courts to dismiss petitions for unreasonable delay if it appeared that the State was "prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing." 57 Finally, the retroactivity rule announced in Teague v. Lane prohibits habeas courts from applying any new constitutional criminal procedure rule 49 As discussed below, there is an exception if the applicant can establish "cause" for the default and "prejudice" from the failure to consider his claims. (1996). AEDPA amendments set forth an elaborate gatekeeping mechanism for determining whether a successive petition should be barred or falls within one of the exceptions. An applicant filing a second or successive petition must first file a motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the petition, which requires the applicant to make a "prima facie showing" that the petition falls within one of the exceptions. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Even if the court of appeals authorizes the district court to consider the petition, moreover, the district court has an independent obligation to ensure that "the claim satisfies the requirements" related to second and successive petitions. but it has gone on to give the "new rule" label a broad reach, declaring it applicable so long as the rule was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" when the Court issued its opinion.
60
Like the procedural default rule (and unlike the exhaustion and abuse of the writ doctrines), Congress has not expressly codified the Teague doctrine.
61
In justifying each of these five limitations on the scope of the habeas writ, the Court-and sometimes Congress as well-has emphasized the importance of "equitable principles." 62 But instead of invoking traditional equitable concepts such as laches or unclean hands, the Court has rested its rules on the basis of three "prudential concerns"-comity, federalism, and interests in finality.
63
The Court's rote invocation of these interests ultimately is unsatisfactory for two related reasons. As an initial matter, a desire to promote interests in comity, federalism, and finality cannot suffice to justify these specific limitations since every rule limiting the availability of 58 149 habeas relief will promote those interests.
64
For example, a state could ask the Court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, to adopt a new gatekeeping rule that conditions access to habeas on an applicant's obtaining certification from the state that his claims have merit. Such a rule would greatly promote the state's interests in comity, federalism, and finality. By severely curtailing the federal habeas remedy, it would promote finality, and it would promote federalism and comity by respecting the state's own assessment of the merits of applicants' claims. Indeed, eliminating the federal habeas remedy altogether for those convicted in state courts would most fully protect these three state interests. As a result, the gatekeeping mechanisms described above cannot be justified simply on the grounds that they further these state interests.
Second, justifying these limitations based on state interests in comity, federalism, and finality fails to honor the habeas writ's deep equitable roots. Although values of comity, federalism, and finality might carry weight in an equitable balance, 65 they cannot stand alone. Even more important, these considerations stray from the core equitable principle that "equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy."
66
Put simply, comity, federalism, and finality at most may constitute interests for habeas courts to 64 See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 (noting that the writ "strikes at finality"); Coleman v. Fla. 1932 ) (characterizing that maxim as "necessarily subordinate to positive principles" and noting that it "cannot be applied either to subvert established rules of law or to give the courts a jurisdiction hitherto unknown"). But comity and federalism considerations never lay at the heart of equity.
consider, but they cannot alone justify mechanical rules barring access to the equitable remedy.
II. THE EQUITABLE ROOTS OF (MOST OF) THE HABEAS BARS The Supreme Court's rote invocation of comity, finality, and federalism to justify the gatekeeping limitations on the writ of habeas corpus does not reflect the equitable roots of the habeas doctrine. In practice, though, most of these limitations reflect attentiveness to equitable principles. 67 In fact, traditional equitable principles have shaped those limitations and the resulting scope of the writ.
68
For this reason, much of the doctrine not only is coherent but also historically well-grounded. Indeed, perhaps because of the Court's recognition of equitable principles in pre-conviction cases, the Court very recently has begun recognizing traditional equitable doctrines to justify its decisions in post-conviction cases.
69
In particular, four of the five gatekeeping bars-exhaustion, procedural default, abuse of the writ, and the statute of limitations in AEDPA-share three characteristics demonstrating their equitable origins. First, each of these four limitations builds on traditional equitable defenses recognized in many fields of law. Second, in keeping with equitable traditions, each of these limitations focuses on the applicant's conduct. Finally, each has individualized exceptions based on equitable considerations. On each of these counts, Teague's nonretroactivity doctrine stands strikingly alone. This is best explained by taking a close look at the four other gatekeeping bars with which the Teague rule contrasts. 67 Of course, the Court has made clear that despite its equitable roots, the habeas remedy still is governed by a "body of statutes, rules, and precedents." Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) . 68 
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A. Habeas Bars and Their Traditional Equitable Corollaries Exhaustion, procedural default, abuse of the writ, and the time-based limitation share a common trait: each parallels traditional equitable defenses. The rationale behind the exhaustion doctrine mirrors the traditional withholding of equitable relief when an applicant has an "adequate remedy at law." The procedural default doctrine similarly tracks the traditional equitable unclean hands defense. The rationale for the abuse of the writ doctrine is the same as for res judicata, a defense applied by courts of equity that is rooted in both efficiency and fairness. Finally, even the statute of limitations enacted by Congress has an equitable corollary in the long-honored equitable doctrine of laches.
1. Exhaustion.-The early habeas exhaustion cases framed the requirement that claims first be presented to the state court in terms of the availability of an alternative remedy.
70
This rationale essentially tracks the traditional defense of withholding equitable relief if an applicant has an available remedy at law.
71
The "available remedy at law" defense developed from the exceptional nature of equitable relief. 72 Thus, if an equitable plaintiff had a remedy at law adequate to redress the injury, the equitable court would stay its hand and withhold the extraordinary equitable remedy on the theory that law goes first. 73 This withholding of relief, moreover, applied whether or not the alternative remedy existed under state or federal law. 74 And it operated with particular force when the applicant sought to restrain state action. The habeas exhaustion requirement mirrors many of those equitable considerations. After all, the courts in forty-nine states provide relief on appeal to criminal defendants whose federal constitutional rights have been abridged.
76
Requiring a habeas applicant to first seek available relief from state courts prevents federal courts from restraining state action where there is another available remedy.
77
In addition, it reserves the extraordinary equitable remedy for those cases in which the applicant's actions demonstrate that he has no state remedy. Or, to put the same point no less poetically, the doctrine precludes a plaintiff from obtaining equitable relief where he "has soiled his hands by wronging . . . the opposite party."
81
In sum, an applicant cannot obtain equitable relief if he has committed a legal wrong related to the dispute that has harmed the defendant. 82 in granting or withholding the extraordinary relief which they may afford, will not ordinarily restrain state officers from collecting state taxes where state law affords an adequate remedy to the taxpayer."). 76 See 
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The shadow of unclean hands hangs over the procedural default doctrine. In this context, it is important to remember that the habeas applicant brings a federal action against the State alleging that his continued detention violates his federal constitutional rights. 83 If the applicant has not complied with the process set forth by the state to review his claims, he has deprived the state court of the opportunity to consider them and to terminate his unlawful detention. Indeed, the Court has justified the procedural default rule on the ground that an applicant "who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements . . . has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance." 84 To be sure, the procedural default doctrine does not precisely replicate the unclean hands defense. In particular, the failure to comply with state procedural rules is not completely equivalent to a legal or moral wrong committed against the State.
85
Although an applicant's noncompliance arguably injures the state by depriving it of an opportunity to correct its error, the State undoubtedly could waive enforcement of its procedural rules to reach the applicant's claim. In that way, the wrong is perhaps better described as forcing the State to choose between its interest in enforcing its generally applicable procedural rules and its interest in having the state court reach the merits of the applicant's claim.
In addition, it is often the applicant's lawyer, not the applicant, who fails to comply with the state's procedural rules. The lawyer may well be acting as the applicant's agent, and the lawyer's conduct therefore is attributable to the applicant, but it is not clear that the unclean hands defense considers the conduct of anyone except the litigant himself.
86
The procedural default doctrine therefore sweeps more broadly than unclean hands. Despite these differences, the two doctrines share sufficient characteristics to ground the procedural default doctrine in equitable principles.
3. Abuse of the Writ.-The abuse of the writ doctrine also has roots in equitable principles. As the Court has noted, the rationale for this limitation parallels the justifications for res judicata, 87 a doctrine with a long history that predates even the English common law split between 83 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887-88 (1983) (characterizing the direct appeal as the "primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence," and the federal habeas remedy as a "secondary and limited" avenue). 84 courts of law and equity.
88
English common law courts adopted both res judicata and collateral estoppel. 89 And although res judicata may not have been recognized as an equitable defense in early English law (unlike adequacy of legal remedies, unclean hands, or laches), 90 there is a long history in the United States of equity courts using the doctrine to block suits.
91
This is no surprise. The essential justification for res judicata, after all, emanates from basic considerations of fairness. A litigant, so the argument goes, rightly deserves one bite at the apple, but not two. Otherwise, courts would facilitate opportunities for harassing defendants or subjecting them to unfairly inconsistent results, in contravention of the principles guiding practice in equitable courts. Over time, courts of equity refined the laches defense to make it resemble closely the defense found in statutes of limitations. Of particular importance, equity courts looked to the statutes of limitations that would govern similar suits at law and then applied those 88 See Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952) (noting that res judicata principles were "early adopted in English law"). 89 See id. at 820-21. 90 Equitable estoppel, which prevents a party from asserting contrary positions as to the same issue, 
B. Focus on the Applicant's Conduct
Each of these four bars turns on the applicant's conduct, a factor that traditionally has been an equitable consideration. 98 The focus on the applicant's conduct is especially apparent in the abuse of the writ and exhaustion doctrines, but it also animates the procedural default and statute of limitations defenses. Indeed, as discussed below, each of these four bars contains exceptions for applicants who were unable to comply with the requirements for reasons beyond their control. 99 The abuse of the writ doctrine especially focuses on the applicant's conduct. Upon filing a first federal habeas petition, the applicant has notice that, absent extraordinary circumstances relating to the unavailability of the claim at the time, all claims must be asserted together. 100 To be sure, the "abuse" this doctrine targets often has less to do with the applicant's conduct than his lawyer's. Much of the criticism of this doctrine therefore stems from concerns about holding clients responsible for their lawyers' errors. Even so, the acts of an agent are normally attributed to the 94 and so this bar reflects consideration of a factor emphasized by courts of equity for generations.
The exhaustion requirement also focuses on the applicant's own conduct-namely, whether he fairly presented the issue to the state court so that it could correct the claimed legal error. And, unlike the other four gatekeepers, the exhaustion bar permits applicants with unexhausted claims to cure that shortcoming even after filing the federal petition.
102
Particularly for this reason, courts can and do attribute any failure to exhaust other available remedies to the informed choice of the applicant himself.
The procedural default doctrine likewise responds to the applicant's conduct-or at least the conduct of his lawyer. Importantly, this defense is not available unless the state procedural rule was "firmly established and regularly followed." 103 Thus, the applicant (or at least his counsel) must be put on fair notice of the need to comply with such rules at the critical point of decision before the applicant suffers forfeiture of his habeas claim. 104 This doctrine, like the abuse of the writ defense, has been criticized both on the ground that applicants should not be prejudiced by their attorneys' mistakes 105 and because in some cases, the rules are hard to discover for even the best lawyers. But these arguments take issue with general principles of agency law rather than with the procedural default doctrine itself.
Finally, the statute of limitations focuses on the applicant's own conduct in the most direct way: it imposes a bar based on the applicant's lack of diligence in presenting claims in federal court. To be sure, AEDPA's limitations period is notably short.
106
But the bar nonetheless relates to a factor within the control of the applicant and his attorney. 107 Thus, each of these habeas bars closely correlates to the applicant's voluntary conduct.
C. Equitable Exceptions
In addition to their focus on the individual applicant's conduct, the existence of individualized exceptions to each of these bars demonstrates their equitable heritage in an especially powerful way. In particular, these exceptions reflect instances in which the applicant's conduct in a given case could be deemed blameless, or the applicant has a distinctively significant need for redress, or both. To be sure, AEDPA's codifications of these gatekeeping bars-particularly abuse of the writ and the statute of limitations-has limited the availability of the equitable exceptions. Even with AEDPA's restrictions of the remedy, however, equitable exceptions to the bars still exist.
Procedural Default and Abuse of the Writ Exceptions.-As
formulated by the Supreme Court, both the procedural default and abuse of the writ doctrines provide an exception if the applicant can establish a justifiable "cause" for the default and "actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law." 108 Given the focus on the applicant's conduct, the equitable origins of this exception can be easily discerned. Indeed, the Court has explained that allowing claims that meet the cause and prejudice exception to go forward "reflect [ prisoner from the usual sanction of default."
109
In other words, where the failure to properly raise a claim (either in accordance with state rules or in an initial federal petition) cannot fairly be attributed to the applicant's conduct, these bars-grounded in equity-should not preclude consideration of a potent or meritorious constitutional claim.
The Court in Martinez v. Ryan discussed at length the equitable nature of the cause and prejudice exception in the context of the procedural default bar. 110 State law expressly required the applicant to raise any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding, rather than on direct review.
111
Martinez's appellate counsel filed his appeal, and while the appeal was pending, she also filed a state habeas petition on Martinez's behalf. The attorney's brief in support of collateral relief did not raise any claim based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the state habeas court dismissed the petition.
112
When Martinez thereafter tried to argue ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in a second state habeas petition, the state court refused to reach the merits of the claim because he had not raised it in his first petition. On federal habeas review, the State argued procedural default, since the state court invoked its successive petition rule to bar consideration of his claim. Martinez then argued that his state habeas counsel's ineffectiveness constituted cause for that procedural default.
113
The Court declined to decide whether applicants have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings (i.e., proceedings in which an applicant raises claims that could not be brought on direct review). Instead, it propounded an "equitable ruling" that an applicant can establish "cause" to excuse procedural default when he can show either ineffective assistance by an attorney appointed in initial-review collateral proceedings or that no counsel was appointed in such proceedings.
114
The Court went to great lengths to emphasize that this rule stemmed from its equitable power to hear substantial claims that were procedurally defaulted through no fault of the applicant. 115 See id. at 1318 ("Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when an attorney's errors (or the absence of an attorney) caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial claim.").
present the claim on direct review, but the state's procedures make it "virtually impossible" for appellate counsel to do so.
116
Both the abuse of the writ and procedural default doctrines also are subject to an additional narrow exception permitting habeas relief where an applicant cannot establish cause and prejudice but can demonstrate either a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" or "actual innocence." 117 This standard imposes an extremely high burden on the applicant, and very few-or no-applicants have been successful in invoking it.
118
But even if it provides only the slimmest possibility for relief, the Court still has fashioned a mechanism for courts to grant relief to otherwise barred claims based on an individualized consideration of the applicant's claim.
119
For procedural default, then, the cause and prejudice exception (along with the individualized consideration of the actual innocence exception, even if the possibility of relief is very slim) provides a meaningful opportunity for applicants to avoid the bar on relief.
In contrast to the cause and prejudice exception to the procedural default bar, the abuse of the writ doctrine's cause and prejudice exception presents a more problematic story. This is so both because the Court accompanied its recognition of the exception with an expansion of the abuse of the writ bar and because Congress has significantly raised the standard for showing cause and prejudice to excuse abuse of the writ. In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court held that a showing of cause and prejudice could excuse an abuse of the writ.
120
Before reaching that conclusion, however, the Court first expanded the scope of the abuse of the writ bar by holding it applicable not just to those who "deliberate[ly] abandon[ed]" their claims in the first petition, but also to any applicant who failed to raise a claim in the first petition even if that failure resulted from neglect rather than deliberate choice. cause and prejudice exception to excuse certain instances of excusable neglect by the applicant, that recognition was overshadowed by its conclusion that the abuse of the writ doctrine applied to negligent (in addition to deliberate) failures to raise claims in initial petitions.
122
Of more importance, when Congress codified the abuse of the writ bar in AEDPA, it replaced the common law cause and prejudice standard with a much more limited exception.
123
Under AEDPA, an abuse of the writ can be excused if:
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
124
The statute's requirement that the applicant establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty absent the constitutional error significantly raises the cause and prejudice standard for abuse of the writ, which previously had required only a showing that there was a "substantial likelihood" that the error prejudiced his chances of a different verdict.
125
That fact notwithstanding, the exception still provides individualized consideration of both the applicant's fault in failing to raise the claim in the first petition and the merits of his claim. 
Exceptions to the Exhaustion
Requirement.-The exhaustion requirement is also subject to exceptions derived from equity. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that so long as a state court has resolved an issue on direct review, the applicant has exhausted the claim and does not have to pursue state collateral review of that issue prior to filing a federal habeas petition on that matter.
127
This rule parallels the maxim that equity does not require an idle or meaningless gesture.
128
In other words, once the state appellate courts have had the opportunity to consider the issue, it makes little sense to "mandate recourse to state collateral review whose results have effectively been predetermined."
129
In addition, because the exhaustion requirement focuses on the applicant's conduct, it requires only that he has fairly and properly presented the issue to a state court.
130
Even if a state court fails to rule on a properly presented claim, the applicant will have adequately exhausted his remedies as long as he has attempted to obtain a state resolution of the issue.
131
The exhaustion requirement, moreover, does not apply unless a state remedy actually exists at the time the applicant files his habeas petition; otherwise, there is no process to exhaust.
132
Finally, because federal courts permit applicants to cure any failures to exhaust, diligent applicants can cure any exhaustion bar. Finally, if the factual predicate for the claim could not have been "discovered through the exercise of due diligence," the statute of limitations begins when the factual predicate could have been discovered.
Exceptions to the
135
In keeping with the focus on the party's conduct that guided equitable courts, each of these exceptions hinges on a circumstance that makes compliance with the statute effectively impossible, so that noncompliance is not fairly attributable to the applicant's choice. In addition, the Court has held that the limitations period may be equitably tolled where the applicant has been "pursuing his rights diligently" and "some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing."
136
This may present a high bar, 137 but its equitable nature could not be more apparent. Tolling turns on both the applicant's conduct and the reasons for the delay, factors central to equitable consideration.
Finally, the Court recently held that the "actual-innocence" or "fundamental miscarriage of justice" gateway applies to the statute of limitations bar as well as to the abuse of the writ and procedural default bars. 138 The Court emphasized that "tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare," 139 and as discussed above, it appears that few, if any, courts have found that a petitioner has made a sufficiently compelling claim of actual innocence to warrant relief, 140 but the gateway at least provides an avenue of relief for the most compelling claims.
All of these exceptions have been criticized on the ground that they are too narrow.
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And an equitable balancing may well counsel in favor of broader exceptions. But at the very least, these individualized exceptions, 134 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 135 Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 136 Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that equitable tolling applies to one-year filing period in part because of "the fact that equitable principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas corpus"). 137 See, e.g., Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2011) ("As a general matter, we set a high bar to deem circumstances sufficiently 'extraordinary' to warrant equitable tolling."). 138 like the bars themselves, demonstrate the equitable considerations underlying the habeas remedy.
III. TEAGUE'S EQUITABLE OUTLIER STATUS Unlike the four gatekeeping requirements discussed above, the nonretroactivity rule from Teague does not reflect principles of equity. It has no analogue in traditional equitable doctrine, it applies without regard to either the applicant's conduct or the strength of his claim, and it has no exceptions that take account of the individual applicant's lack of fault. Understanding the origins and basic operation of the Teague rule helps to demonstrate its status as an inequitable outlier in the law of habeas corpus.
A. Teague's History and Operation
Teague announced a sweeping new rule. Until 1965, federal courts routinely applied the Supreme Court's new rules of criminal procedure to all cases that came before them, whether on direct review or in habeas proceedings. 142 Indeed, the Court sometimes declared new constitutional rules in habeas cases. 143 In Linkletter v. Walker, however, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not require it to apply its decisions retroactively and set forth a new rule for assessing retroactivity. 144 Under the Linkletter rule, the Court was to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." should not apply retroactively to cases "finally decided"-i.e., cases that had run the course of direct appeal and petition for certiorari-prior to Mapp.
148
Linkletter led to complaints that it was inconsistently applied. 149 In several opinions, Justice Harlan urged the 142 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965) (noting that the Court previously had "applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule"). 143 See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (holding in a habeas proceeding that bail "must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant" (emphasis added) Court to adopt a standard that would make new constitutional rules applicable to all cases that were not final on direct review at the time of the Court's new rule, but inapplicable to cases that were final on direct review at that time.
150
He argued that this standard would bring greater clarity and consistency to the Court's treatment of retroactivity issues.
Twenty years after Linkletter, Justice Harlan's argument bore fruit when the Court announced the Teague gatekeeping limitation, under which most new rules would not apply retroactively to finally decided cases. 151 The Court in Teague discussed at length Justice Harlan's earlier observations in concluding that collateral habeas review and direct appellate review serve different purposes.
152
While direct review seeks to protect the defendant's individual rights, "the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards." 153 Thus, the Court concluded, because the "interests of comity and finality must . . . be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review" and because applying new rules to final convictions imposes costs on states that "generally far outweigh the benefits of this application," Justice Harlan's direct-review-centered approach to retroactivity struck the proper legal balance. 154 Under the Teague gatekeeping limitation, if a Supreme Court decision announces a "new rule" of criminal procedure, that rule may not be invoked in pending federal habeas proceedings reviewing state imprisonment 155 unless it falls within one of two "exceptions," the first of which is more properly characterized as a definition of the scope of the Teague rule rather than an "exception" and the second of which appears to exist only in theory. 156 First, the Court limited the retroactivity ban to new "procedural" rules that "regulate only the manner of determining the 150 If a new rule is substantive, i.e., it makes certain conduct noncriminal or prohibits certain penalties for a particular class of offenders, then Teague does not apply, and the new rule applies equally to cases on direct and collateral habeas review. 158 In recent years, the Court has decided several substantive (rather than procedural) Eighth Amendment cases, concluding that certain categories of offenders cannot be subject to the death penalty or life-without-parole sentences. 159 Most of the Court's new rulings in criminal cases are procedural, though, and habeas applicants therefore cannot invoke them retroactively. 160 The Teague rule has one other exception: a new procedural rule may apply retroactively if it constitutes a "watershed rule[] . . . implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding," 161 or, to put it another way, a "bedrock procedural rule[] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 162 The most important feature of this "exception" is that it apparently exists only in theory. The Court has expressed great skepticism about whether any new constitutional rule could meet this exacting standard. 163 Indeed, it never has found any new procedural rule that falls within the reach of this so-called exception. 
B. The Effects of Teague
Teague has sparked much criticism both because of the breadth of the Supreme Court's rule and because of its perceived unfairness. 165 As to the former critique, the Court, in applying Teague, has defined "new" rules broadly to encompass any rule that either was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" at the time the applicant's conviction became final 166 or was not "apparent to all reasonable jurists." 167 Stated somewhat differently, federal habeas courts must "determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution." 168 If not, then the rule is new. The breadth of this definition cannot be overstated. After all, unanimity among reasonable jurists on any constitutional issue before the Supreme Court is rare. 169 Even if an applicant relies on cases already decided at the time his conviction became final, moreover, the habeas court still must ascertain whether the applicant's claim seeks to have the prior decision "applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent." Indeed, it appears that Teague bars consideration even of new claims that can only be considered on habeas, such as a claim that a habeas applicant has a right to effective assistance of counsel on postconviction review. 173 Thus, Teague bars relief on any claim that relies on any extension of even well-established rules.
The second chief complaint about the Teague rule is that it unfairly compels different results for similarly situated applicants based only on the happenstance of when their cases become final, while turning a blind eye to the consequences of leaving the constitutional error unremedied in one case and not another. 174 Notably, empirical evidence demonstrates that Teague bars claims in capital cases at a significantly higher rate than in noncapital cases. 175 An example illustrates the point. In 1983, George Banks was convicted on twelve counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Pennsylvania after he killed thirteen people.
176
Most of his victims were members of his immediate or extended family, and five of them were his children.
177
Both at trial and during the sentencing phase, experts disputed the extent and impact of Banks's mental illness. 178 Defense experts concluded that Banks had long suffered from a severe mental defect (paranoid psychosis with paranoid delusions) and that because of this illness, he was incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his criminal acts, or distinguishing right from wrong.
179
According to these witnesses, Banks, a former prison guard, was taunted as a child because he had one black and one white parent. He "developed a persecution complex and became obsessed with the paranoid delusion that there were soon to be international race wars and uprisings."
180
He armed himself for the coming race wars and spoke of killing himself and his "children rather than see them brought up as he had been in a racist society. did not dispute the defense experts' diagnosis, but they disagreed with the claim that the delusions made Banks unable to distinguish right from wrong.
Less than one year after Banks's conviction became final, in Mills v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a capital sentencing scheme that required jurors to disregard any mitigating factors upon which they did not unanimously agree.
182
Two years later, in Boyde v. California, the Court clarified that the Mills rule encompassed sentencing schemes in which there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted instructions in an unconstitutional manner, i.e., as requiring juror unanimity on mitigating factors. 183 Banks, both in state post-conviction collateral proceedings 184 and later in federal habeas proceedings, argued that a reasonable jury could have interpreted the instructions given in his case to unconstitutionally require juror unanimity as to mitigating circumstances, including the existence of his mental disorders.
185
Given the mitigating evidence Banks presented and the extent to which that evidence was disputed by the parties' expert witnesses, any such juror misunderstanding could have affected the sentence, and in fact the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that Banks's sentencing was unconstitutional under Mills.
186
It thus granted habeas relief.
187
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mills articulated a new procedural rule that under Teague did not apply to cases-like Banks'sthat were final when the Court issued Mills. 188 The Court recognized that the Mills rule was intended to enhance the accuracy of sentencing proceedings and to guard against the risk that "[e]leven of twelve jurors, could, for example, agree that six mitigating circumstances existed, but one holdout juror could nevertheless force the death sentence." 189 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that because Mills "applies fairly narrowly and works no fundamental shift in our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to fundamental fairness," it did not fall within Teague's watershed-rule exception.
190
As a result, based only on the date his conviction became final, Banks could not obtain redress for any Mills error, regardless of how grave it was. Banks, of course, could be an extraordinary case. Since 1989, however, the Court has announced new procedural rules in a variety of areas, 193 many of which would have had significant impact in habeas proceedings in capital cases. For instance, in Ring v. Arizona, the Court held unconstitutional Arizona's capital statute because it permitted judges, rather than juries, to make findings of fact necessary to make the defendant death eligible, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 194 Two years later, the Court held that Ring announced a new procedural rule that did not apply to convictions already final when it issued Ring. 195 Similarly, in Simmons v. South Carolina, the plurality opined that if the State argues future dangerousness, and if life without parole is the only alternative to a death sentence, then capital defendants have a right to a jury instruction that the defendant will be sentenced to life without parole if not sentenced to death.
196
Three years later, the Court held that Simmons announced a new procedural rule not retroactively applicable to convictions that had become final before its announcement. 197 The Court's holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi-that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty when the jury is led to believe that it is not responsible for the ultimate decision because an appellate court would review the sentence for correctness apply retroactively.
199
As a result, capital habeas applicants whose sentencing proceedings violated the Constitution under Caldwell have no remedy for that constitutional error. 200 To be sure, the criticism that Teague unfairly treats defendants differently based only on the relatively random date on which their convictions become final may carry little weight with those who view habeas only as a mechanism to ensure the state provides adequate process for correcting constitutional violations, rather than as a means for correcting all constitutional errors.
201
But limiting habeas only to ensuring adequate state processes is completely inconsistent with the historical equitable nature of the habeas remedy. After all, as Professor Halliday's careful history of habeas demonstrates, the remedy was designed to hear the "sighs" of all prisoners.
202
And of greater concern, the Teague rule-a rule that clearly has an impact on many of the most serious cases-is not grounded in the equitable principles that guide the other gatekeeping bars. So we turn now to the Teague rule's incompatibility with equity.
C. The Anomalous and Inequitable Nature of the Teague Rule
Unlike the other bars on habeas relief, the Teague retroactivity rule cannot be justified on equitable grounds. None of the traditional equity defenses-availability of relief at law, unclean hands, laches, or estoppeleven arguably correlate with the Teague doctrine. In addition, in contrast to the other four gatekeeping doctrines, the applicant's conduct has no bearing on the application of the retroactivity bar.
203
For instance, an applicant who has diligently presented his claim to the state court and timely filed his petition in federal court still cannot obtain relief for any claim that requires 199 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 244-45 (1990) . 200 The Teague retroactivity bar does not focus on whether the state violated the applicant's constitutional rights but instead whether "a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought." Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008) . In other words, the Teague bar relates to the absence of a remedy, not the absence of a right. See id. at 291 ("A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial-only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts."). This is so because the source of new constitutional rules is the Constitution itself, not any inherent power of the Court to create new rules. "Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule." Id. Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577 (1993) (discussing the two competing models of habeas corpus review: the "full-review" model under which courts should fully review any properly preserved constitutional claims and the "institutional competence" model restricting habeas review where the applicant had a "'full and fair' opportunity" to present claims in state court). 202 HALLIDAY, supra note 22, at 7. 203 See supra Part II.B.
any extension of the Supreme Court's federal constitutional procedural rules. He has not unreasonably delayed, he has no remedy under the state court system, and he has raised the argument at every reasonably available opportunity. Put simply, retroactivity falls completely outside both the equitable defenses and the equitable justifications that underlie the other four procedural bars.
204
Unlike the four habeas bars discussed above, moreover, the Teague rule has no individualized exception. 205 As discussed above, 206 the Court in Teague recognized only two "exceptions," neither of which gives individualized consideration to the claim presented. The first-permitting retroactive application of substantive rules-has nothing to do with differentiating claims based upon equitable considerations such as the applicant's conduct. Indeed, the specialized treatment of substantive rulings is not an exception-much less an equitable exception-to the Teague rule at all. As the Court itself has recognized: "[Although this Court has] sometimes referred to [substantive] rules . . . as falling under an exception to Teague's bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, they are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to the bar."
207
The broader point is that neither the Teague rule nor its substantive rule "exception" has anything to do with equitable consideration of the applicant's own delay, forfeiture of claims, or repetitive use of the writ. Teague involves only a technical decision about whether a new rule is "procedural" or "substantive."
208
Such a categorization has nothing whatsoever to do with the applicant's conduct and the equities to which that conduct gives rise.
Nor does the second Teague "exception"-for watershed rules of criminal procedure-provide individualized consideration. Indeed the Court not only applies it categorically for each new rule, with no consideration of the merits of individual claims, but the Court has never found a rule that meets its criteria. In order to decide whether a new rule is 204 The Court has justified its Teague rule by invoking other equitable considerations such as judicial economy, but it has never claimed that its rule falls within any of the traditional equitable defenses. See supra Part III.A. 205 The one individualized exception that might apply provides relief if the applicant can "watershed," the Court does consider whether the rule is "necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction," 209 but the Court has been clear that the fact that a particular new rule enhances the accuracy of the proceedings or might enhance accuracy in a particular case does not suffice. 210 Instead, a qualifying rule must be necessary to prevent "an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction" 211 in general-as opposed to serving to prevent an inaccurate conviction in an individual case. Thus, far from creating an individualized exception to the Teague rule based upon the applicant's behavior or the strength of his claim, the watershed rule exception constitutes only a generalized judgment regarding the fundamental nature of the rule. As discussed above, moreover, the Court has expressed great skepticism that a new rule could ever be "watershed," calling into question whether this creates an exception at all.
212
Thus, neither the Teague rule nor either of its "exceptions" is marked by any of the equitable characteristics that animate the other gatekeeping habeas requirements. immediately after the decision, 213 none of that criticism appears to have moved the Court in the slightest to overrule it.
IV. EQUITY AND NONRETROACTIVITY REVISITED
The Court could, however, explore a more modest alternative. In keeping with the principles that govern every other habeas gatekeeping doctrine, the Court could ease the rigidity of the Teague rule by permitting equitable exceptions to its operation in individual cases. The Court certainly has the authority to restore equity by fashioning individualized equitable exceptions. Particularly given the Court's recent recognition of the importance of equitable considerations in setting the rules of habeas, this appears to be the perfect opportunity for the Court to consider equitable exceptions to the Teague nonretroactivity rule. 214 It should exercise its authority to adopt equitable exceptions both because individualized exceptions would mitigate Teague's most inequitable characteristics and because it could do so at little cost to the finality and manageability concerns that the Court has invoked in support of Teague.
A. Restoring Equity
To introduce equity to the Teague rule, the Court should devise equitable exceptions to the general retroactivity bar that would match the equitable considerations that run through the other gatekeeping bars. The precise content and operation of these exceptions could take a variety of forms and will only be set forth generally below, but three equitable considerations should govern their development. The first should be formulated in keeping with equity's focus on the conduct of the applicant and the exceptions to the other bars that take account of the applicant's conduct. Specifically, the Court should consider the extent to which the applicant has diligently raised the claim in state proceedings even prior to the Court's announcement of the new rule. The second exception should depend on the magnitude of the applicant's interest in the new rule's retroactive application. Finally, in keeping with the equitable tradition of providing a remedy where no other remedy is available, the Court should provide an exception to consider arguments for new rules that can only be considered on habeas. 215 An ameliorative doctrine that takes account of these considerations would restore at least a modicum of equity to the Court's retroactivity doctrine.
The one potential barrier to consideration of claims that meet any exception the Court may create is AEDPA's prohibition on granting relief on a claim that the state court adjudicated on the merits unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 216 The Court has interpreted this statutory provision to mean that the law must have been "clearly established" at the time of the last state court decision on the merits.
217
It has not, however, decided whether cases that fall within a Teague "exception" should be treated differently, i.e., whether, assuming that a Teague exception applies, the law need only be "clearly established" at the time the federal court considers the habeas application or needs to be clearly established at the time the state court considered the issue. In order for applicants to obtain relief under new rules falling within the proposed exceptions detailed below, the Court should conclude that Greene does not apply to Teague exceptions. For the limited number of cases falling within one of the proposed exceptions, courts instead should assess whether the rule was "clearly established" immediately after the Supreme Court's new ruling.
Providing Relief for Blameless
Applicants.-Permitting retroactive application of new rules when the applicant's conduct in pursuing his claim has been blameless goes to the core of equity.
218
In particular, where the applicant has diligently pursued the claim before the state courts and those courts have ruled on the merits of that claim, no fault can be attributed to the applicant. The precise definition of "testimonial" under Crawford remains subject to some debate, but it has been clear from the time Crawford was decided that a formal police interview like that between David and the police constitutes a testimonial assertion 226 and that Swendby's testimony at the trial of Bintz's brother was "testimonial." Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a statement more "testimonial" than a witness's testimony from another criminal trial. 227 At every step of the process, Robert Bintz raised, preserved, and litigated the claim that admission of these statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. And the state courts addressed the merits of his claims. 228 As it turns out, the state courts were wrong and Robert Bintz was right-the statements were testimonial and their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. But because the Court issued the opinion in Crawford after Bintz's time for seeking certiorari on direct appeal passed, Teague barred any relief. 229 For an applicant like Bintz, who makes every effort to present a particular claim of constitutional error to the state courts, and who would prevail but for the accident of timing and the Supreme Court's decision to deny his petition and accept a different case on certiorari, it seems not only inconsistent with fundamental notions of equity but also manifestly unfair to deny a remedy. The Court should rectify that unfairness by adopting an equitable exception to Teague's retroactivity bar for claims, presented to state courts prior to the Court's announcement of the new rule, that are meritorious under the new rule.
Formulating an Exception to Correct the Most Significant
Errors.-Just as providing an exception for blameless conduct imports equitable principles into the retroactivity doctrine, so too does providing a remedy where the constitutional error had the most significant impact on the applicant. Indeed, equity courts arose for the very purpose of remedying claims of strong perceived injustices that could not be addressed in courts of law because of the mechanical operation of the rules of those courts. 230 harm resulting from constitutional error. But the Supreme Court might fashion such an exception to the Teague rule by balancing factors related to the applicant's claim against the state's interest in finality. These factors should include an assessment of the strength of the applicant's argument that there was error under the new rule, the extent to which that error affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the severity of the resulting penalty. What follows is one possible method for weighing those interests.
As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the state has an interest in finality in every habeas case.
231
The Court therefore could create a Teague exception that requires applicants to make a threshold showing that the alleged constitutional error in fact is an error under the new rule, that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings, and that the penalty imposed was serious. Because this is a balancing standard, these factors would fall across a continuum. 232 So, for instance, if an applicant had a very strong claim that there was constitutional error that affected the outcome of his proceedings, he might be able to establish his interest even if his sentence was ten years, rather than life or death. And an applicant sentenced to death might meet this test even if his claims on the merits are slightly weaker. If the applicant cannot make the threshold showing (and his case does not fall within one of the other exceptions), Teague would preclude retroactive application of the new constitutional rule. If, however, the applicant establishes these factors, the presumption would be that his claim falls within the equitable exception, and the new rule applies unless the state has an additional interest in nonretroactivity (besides finality and comity) that outweighs the applicant's interest.
The first factor-the strength of the applicant's argument that there was error under the new rule-would require the federal habeas court to evaluate the merits of his claim, imposing some burden on the court. But 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2461, 2472-73 (2006) (noting that courts of chancery were created because "many meritorious claims were barred from proceeding by the rigidity of the law courts," which limited relief to very specific categories of cases); cf. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986) (noting that, in extraordinary cases, courts may hear and grant a habeas claim despite an applicable limitation and without a showing of cause and prejudice, when they can determine that a constitutional violation probably has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent). 231 this small burden should not preclude this factor. There was a long tradition of equitable courts assessing the strength of claims presented by petitioners, even if the equitable court had no jurisdiction over those claims.
233
In addition, as a practical matter, federal habeas courts-both district courts and courts of appeals-often assess the merits of the applicant's claim as an alternative basis for their rulings, 234 so this would not require substantially more work than habeas courts already undertake.
The second factor requires the court to assess the impact of the constitutional error on the outcome of the proceedings. Federal habeas courts have a long history of evaluating the extent to which a particular constitutional error affected the scope of the proceedings. 235 Given that experience, the Court could easily fashion a standard that would ensure that only the most meritorious claims receive the benefit of retroactivity. For instance, the Court could use the harmless error standard that applies to constitutional error identified on habeas review. This standard precludes relief unless the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 236 The precise content of the standard has been the subject of some dispute within the Court, primarily because the Court has offered conflicting opinions regarding whether the standard properly should focus on the jury's verdict and the extent to which the constitutional error affected it, 237 or on the strength of the other untainted evidence presented at trial and the likelihood that another jury would reach the same conclusion even absent the constitutional error. notwithstanding, the harmless error standard continues to apply in habeas cases, and federal courts have significant experience applying it.
239
This standard also appears to screen all but the most compelling claims. Indeed, according to one influential study tracking the success rates of federal habeas cases, in only 4 out of 267 capital cases (less than 1.5%) and 4 out of more than 2000 noncapital cases (less than 0.17%) did the district court find the alleged constitutional error not harmless. 240 Thus, the harmless error standard ensures that relief is reserved for the most significant claims of constitutional error.
The final factor on the applicant's side of the balancing-the penalty imposed-would be relatively straightforward to consider in the analysis. To put it simply, given equivalently strong arguments that constitutional error affected the outcome of proceedings, applicants sentenced to death or life without parole 241 would be much more likely to obtain retroactive application of a new rule than applicants sentenced to terms of several years.
242
As others have recognized, it is a far different thing to subject an individual to a death sentence or life imprisonment on legally dubious grounds than to, for example, subject that person to a monetary fine or the loss of a subsidy. 243 Equity, in short, concerns itself with proportionality. Thus, the more severe the punishment imposed, the stronger the case to temper Teague's otherwise wooden rule. Death penalty cases and those involving significant terms of incarceration already constitute the bulk of the federal habeas docket, 244 and adopting a penalty-sensitive approach to the balancing therefore likely would not result in significantly increased habeas filings. 239 See, e.g., Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (affirming that the Brecht standard applies to all habeas harmless error cases regardless of whether the lower state court used the traditional "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 4-5 (1996) (per curiam) (remanding case for lower court to apply the Brecht standard and emphasizing that it applies to all habeas claims related to "trial errors"); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (applying the Brecht harmless error standard and finding that when a judge "is in grave doubt" as to whether it is met, "that error is not harmless"). 240 On the State's side of the balancing, the State always has an interest in ensuring finality of convictions. And that interest would be sufficient to outweigh the applicant's interests if the applicant could not make a sufficient showing on the factors described above. If the court deemed the applicant's claim sufficiently compelling to overcome the State's interest in finality, however, the State then could identify any additional interests specific to the applicant's case, including, for example, that a long period of time elapsed since conviction, making retrial impossible. If the State articulated specific additional interests in finality, the trial court then would have to include those interests in the balance.
An example illustrates the point. Recall Robert Bintz, the defendant against whom the State introduced a number of out-of-court statements, including (1) a confession to law enforcement officers given by his brother, David, and (2) testimony that David's cellmate had given at David's trial. 245 As discussed above, Bintz had a strong claim that Crawford v. Washington would have prohibited admission of these two statements if it had applied.
246
And he was sentenced to life in prison as a result of his conviction.
247
Two of the three factors-the strength of Bintz's claim and the magnitude of the penalty-therefore weigh strongly in favor of retroactive application of Crawford. The last factor is subject to more argument. After all, the disputed testimony, from the mouth of his brother, arguably provided significantly damning evidence against Bintz. On the other hand, the disputed evidence arguably was cumulative.
248
But the other two factors arguably would have outweighed the strength of the evidence. Bintz therefore would have had a strong case that he met a threshold showing necessary for retroactive application of Crawford.
The State might, of course, have had significant arguments against retroactivity. In particular, although less than a year and a half passed between the time Bintz's conviction became final and the Court's decision in Crawford, the time between the conviction and habeas petition was relatively significant, which gave the State an argument that it had a significant interest in finality. That fact notwithstanding, Bintz likely had a strong argument that he was entitled to retroactive application of Crawford under this standard. 245 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. 246 See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. The Government's best argument that Swendby's testimony was admissible probably would be that Swendby testified at Bintz's preliminary hearing, so Bintz presumably had at least some opportunity to cross-examine him then. Under this proposed standard, there will, of course, be many cases where the applicant has only a weak claim of constitutional error under the new rule, and the argument for retroactive application therefore will fail with little effort by the courts. And there also will be cases in which the applicant has little to no argument that error under the new rule affected the outcome of his case, and the courts can easily conclude that the new rule does not apply retroactively.
Admittedly, this standard will also give rise to more difficult questions. 
252
But the State had a strong argument that nothing in the proceedings violated the rule announced in Mills and that even if it did, the jury's verdict was not affected by that error. And of course, Banks was a capital case, further raising the stakes. Cases like Banks would require significant thought and effort by the courts to assess the applicant's (and the State's) interests in retroactivity or nonretroactivity, and it is not at all clear whether Banks would qualify for the proposed exception. But it is fair to say that such effort is justified in cases involving the most significant penalties, and, in fact, the courts in Banks appear to have devoted significant time and thought to the case, even in the absence of a Teague exception. In short, this exception may require some work on the part of federal habeas courts, but that effort ensures that applicants get individual consideration of their claims and ultimately that habeas remains true to its equitable origins.
3. The "No-Forum" Exception.-Finally, the Supreme Court should adopt an exception to Teague's nonretroactivity rule so that federal habeas courts can consider arguments for new federal constitutional rules that cannot (and could never) be decided in any other forum. Such an exception would reflect the extraordinary nature of the equitable remedy of the writ of habeas corpus and the fact that it was designed to remediate errors for which there are no other remedies.
253
Teague effectively prohibits the Court from even considering whether to adopt a new procedural rule in a habeas case. The Court cannot announce such a rule in a habeas case, no matter how well-preserved and 249 253 See supra note 72 (listing cases describing the extraordinary nature of the remedy); supra note 230 (identifying sources documenting the history of the courts of equity as providing remedies to those who had no remedy at law).
important the issue, unless it falls within the "watershed rule" exception 254 -an exception, as articulated above, that the Court has never used.
255
Teague therefore effectively prohibits the Court from adopting any new procedural rule that would apply only in habeas proceedings.
Again, an example illustrates the problem. As the law stands, Teague prevents any federal court from deciding that state habeas applicants (or any category of them) have a right to counsel in those proceedings. The Court held in Coleman v. Thompson that there generally is no right to counsel in state post-conviction habeas proceedings. 256 It left open, however, the question of whether states must appoint counsel in "collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial" (so-called "initial-review collateral proceedings") 257 and whether capital habeas defendants have a right to counsel in their first collateral proceeding (although it has strongly indicated that they do not).
258
If the Court wanted to revisit the right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings or capital defendants' right to counsel for first habeas proceedings, it does not appear that the Court could reach either issue in any proceeding. After all, any rule providing such a right would be a new rule and thus would be barred by Teague. 259 And because the claimed right by its nature would apply only on collateral review, defendants on direct review would lack standing to raise this issue. 260 Thus, because the conviction of any applicant raising such a claim already would be final (and the claim therefore Teague-barred), the result would be that no 254 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("[H]abeas defendant-and, in particular, no habeas applicant-could bring the issue before the Court.
261
In this way, Teague has fundamentally altered the Court's institutional role as the final arbiter of federal constitutional rights by restricting the Court's ability to reach, in any case, issues related to applicants' federal constitutional rights. This is so because Teague not only prevents the Court from reaching the issue in a federal habeas proceeding, but also precludes the Court from reaching the issue on certiorari from a state habeas proceeding. If, for example, an applicant seeks state (rather than federal) habeas relief, arguing that the federal Constitution gives capital defendants a right to counsel in first habeas proceedings, the state court conclusion that there is no such right cannot be challenged either on direct review to the Supreme Court or by way of federal habeas. The difficulty is that such a claim arises only in collateral proceedings, and Teague therefore forecloses any consideration of the state court's ruling that would produce a "new rule."
As a practical matter, the Teague-barred claims in this category will relate to a limited category of cases: (1) right to counsel in certain types of collateral proceedings, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at stages of direct review that result in a denial of certiorari (and thus a final conviction), 262 (3) constitutional claims related to the Court's certiorari process on direct review, or (4) other constitutional rights of applicants either on state or federal habeas. The absence of any forum to consider these issues, and the concomitant absence of any mechanism for the Court ever to do so, argues in favor of the creation of an exception for this category of cases. 261 The Court recently confronted this issue regarding the right to counsel on initial-review collateral proceedings. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319. As discussed supra Part II.C, the Court in Martinez refused to decide whether applicants have such a constitutional right, instead holding that as an equitable matter, the failure to appoint counsel in those proceedings could constitute cause to excuse procedural default. There now would be a much stronger argument that any determination of the constitutional right to counsel in these proceedings would not be a "new rule." But the combination of the Court's broad definition of "new rules" and its express reservation of the issue in Martinez still might mean that this would constitute a new rule, in which case habeas applicants could not use it unless they could successfully argue that it represents a "watershed rule." 262 The Court has never recognized a right to counsel, and therefore the right to the effective assistance of counsel, at any "discretionary" stage, which includes petitions for certiorari to the highest state court or the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting the applicant's habeas claim that his counsel was ineffective in filing his petition for certiorari because he had no constitutional right to counsel at the certiorari filing stage, so "he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel" at that time (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (rejecting the argument for a right to counsel beyond the direct appeal of right))).
Indeed, a court addressing one of those claims developed just such an exception. In Jackson v. Johnson, the applicant sought to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the grounds that his counsel on direct state appeal failed to file a timely motion for rehearing. 263 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Jackson sought to have the court decide a new constitutional rule with respect to the reach of ineffective assistance claims. 264 But it also recognized that "the constitutional question presented . . . could be raised only on collateral review," and it therefore found itself "obliged to give serious consideration to the merits of [the] claim," Teague's bar notwithstanding. 265 Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit in Jackson, the Supreme Court should create an exception to Teague so that this type of issue can be considered. Indeed, in Jackson v. Johnson, the claim for an equitable exception to Teague is particularly compelling because without one, there would be no adequate remedy anywhere for the allegedly wronged applicant.
B. The Costs of Equity
The argument that the Supreme Court should adopt equity-based exceptions to the Teague nonretroactivity rule might raise concerns about state interests in finality and, especially, judicial efficiency. Although the Court emphasized finality interests in Teague, 266 concerns about its own caseload may have been more urgent. After all, decisions like Blakely v. Washington, holding unconstitutional sentencing under guidelines systems that permit enhanced sentences based on judicial findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence, 267 affect a huge number of cases. 268 Indeed, the Blakely dissent warned that the Court's holding, even if applied only prospectively, "threatens an untold number of criminal judgments." 269 The prospect of thousands of additional cases stemming from applying similar
